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Abstract	
Do	parties	change	their	platform	in	anticipation	of	electoral	losses?	Or	do	parties	respond	to	experienced	
losses	at	the	previous	election?	These	questions	relate	to	two	mechanisms	to	align	public	opinion	with	
party	platforms:	(1)	rational	anticipation,	and	(2)	electoral	performance.	While	extant	work	empirically	
tested,	and	found	support	for,	the	latter	mechanism,	the	effect	of	rational	anticipation	has	not	been	put	
to	an	empirical	test	yet.	In	this	paper,	we	contribute	to	the	literature	on	party	platform	change	by	theo-
rizing	and	assessing	how	party	performance	(electoral	results,	standing	in	the	polls	and	government	par-
ticipation)	motivates	parties	to	change	their	platform	in-between	elections.	We	built	a	new	and	unique	
dataset	of	>20,000	press	releases	 issued	by	15	Dutch	national	political	parties	that	were	 in	parliament	
between	1997	and	2014.	These	data	are	particularly	apt	to	identify	parties’	strategies	in-between	elec-
tions	and	therefore	allow	us	to	test	both	mechanisms;	something	that	is	impossible	by	examining	changes	
in	parties’	election	manifestos	–	the	typical	data	such	studies	use.	Utilizing	automated	text	analysis	(topic	
modeling)	to	measure	parties’	platform	change,	we	show	that	electoral	defeat	motivates	party	platform	
change	in-between	elections.	In	line	with	existing	findings,	we	demonstrate	that	parties	are	backward-
looking.	Still,	we	find	this	effect	only	for	opposition	parties	and,	interestingly,	no	indication	that	this	effect	
weakens	over	time.	Moreover,	our	findings	demonstrate	that	electoral	prospects	fail	to	influence	party	
platform	change,	disconfirming	 the	rational	anticipation	mechanism.	Additionally,	 the	 findings	provide	
important	insights	on	the	role	of	government	participation.		
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The	literature	on	political	representation	identifies	two	key	mechanisms	to	align	public	opinion	and	par-
ties’	electoral	platforms.	The	first	one	is	electoral	performance,	whereby	poor	electoral	performance	mo-
tivates	parties	to	change	their	platform	(Budge	1994;	Budge,	Ezrow,	and	McDonald	2010;	Harmel	et	al.	
1995;	 Harmel	 and	 Janda	 1994;	 Somer-Topcu	 2009).	 The	 second	 mechanism	 is	 rational	 anticipation	
(Stimson,	Mackuen,	and	Erikson	1995)	or	electoral	prospects.	Here,	parties	change	their	platform	to	align	
more	closely	to	the	electorate	 in	anticipation	of	poor	future	electoral	performance	(Erikson,	Mackuen,	
and	Stimson	2002;	Geer	1996;	Laver	2005;	Laver	and	Sergenti	2012).	While	there	is	a	burgeoning	literature	
testing,	and	regularly	finding	support	for,	the	first	mechanism	(for	overviews	see	Adams	2012;	Fagerholm	
2015),	the	second	mechanism	–	rational	anticipation	–	has	been	more	or	less	ignored	by	this	literature.	
Consequently,	we	do	not	conclusively	know	whether	parties	are	 looking	back	 to	past	electoral	perfor-
mance,	as	the	first	mechanism	proposes.	Or	whether	they	are	looking	forward	and	change	their	platform	
in	anticipation	of	electoral	performance,	as	the	second,	rational	anticipation,	mechanism	proposes.	Given	
that	governing	parties	and	opposition	ones	may	have	different	incentives	to	change	their	platform	(e.g.,	
Schumacher	et	al.	2015),	 this	difference	 should	also	be	explored.	 In	 this	paper,	we	do	exactly	 that	by	
examining	party	platform	change	in-between	elections,	taking	into	account	the	moderating	effects	of	tim-
ing	between	elections	and	the	effect	of	government	participation.		
To	address	these	questions,	we	need	data	in-between	elections.	Our	data	cover	Dutch	political	
parties	between	1997	and	2014.	We	use	the	Netherlands	because	the	high	number	of	parties,	the	high	
level	of	electoral	volatility,	and	the	absence	of	fixed	coalitions	ensure	much	variation	over-time	in	who	
governs,	and	in	parties’	electoral	performance.	This	makes	the	decision-making	environment	complex.	So,	
if	we	 find	an	effect	here,	we	are	 likely	 to	generalize	 this	 finding	also	 to	other	–	 in	many	 respects	 less	
complex	–	Western	European	party	systems.	We	created	a	new	dataset	of	21,773	press	releases	from	15	
political	parties.	We	analyze	press	releases	rather	than	other	sources	of	party	platforms	for	three	reasons.	
First,	election	manifestos	are	produced	at	the	time	of	an	election	only,	thereby	failing	to	capture	parties’	
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reactions	to	environmental	stimuli	 in-between	elections.	The	rational	anticipation	mechanism	can	thus	
not	be	tested	with	party	manifesto	data.	Second,	press	releases	are	more	independent	(i.e.	parties	have	
more	agency)	from	the	legislative	agenda	and	the	media	agenda	compared	to	other	sources	that	are	avail-
able	in-between	elections,	such	as	legislative	speeches,	legislative	voting	behavior	or	media	reports	about	
party	 positions	 (Helbling	 and	 Tresch	 2011;	 Kriesi	 et	 al.	 2006,	 2008;	De	Nooy	 and	Kleinnijenhuis	 2013;	
Proksch	 and	 Slapin	 2015).	 Third,	 parties’	 press	 releases	 influence	 the	 media	 agenda	 (Asp	 1983;	
Brandenburg	2002;	Walgrave	and	Van	Aelst	2006)	and	 thereby	 the	 salience	of	particular	 issues	 in	 the	
perception	of	voters	(McCombs	and	Shaw	1972;	Weaver,	McCombs,	and	Shaw	2004).	Because	issue	sali-
ence	is	an	important	predictor	of	vote	choice	(Brandenburg	2002;	Green	and	Hobolt	2008;	Kleinnijenhuis	
and	Ridder	1998),	parties	use	press	releases	strategically	to	manipulate	voters’	perception	of	what	parties	
stand	for.	Therefore,	press	releases	are	a	good	source	to	analyze	how	parties	respond	to	(prospective)	
electoral	 performance	 and	 government–opposition	 dynamics.	We	 construct	 a	 dependent	 variable,	 la-
belled	party	platform	change,	which	analyzes	the	changes	in	a	party’s	attention	to	issues	(i.e.	the	salience	
thereof)	in	their	press	releases.	We	use	hierarchical	topic	modelling	–	an	automated	text	analysis	tool	–	
(Grimmer	2010;	Grimmer	and	Stewart	2013)	to	identify	the	topics	of	press	releases.	
We	hypothesize	 that	proximity	 to	elections	moderates	 the	effects	of	past	and	 future	electoral	
performance.	Past	electoral	performance	should	be	 the	most	 relevant	directly	after	an	election,	while	
information	about	future	electoral	performance	should	be	the	most	relevant	the	closer	is	the	next	elec-
tion.	Our	findings	suggest	that	electoral	defeat	indeed	motivates	party	platform	change	in-between	elec-
tions.	 However,	 we	 find	 such	 an	 effect	 only	 for	 opposition	 parties.	 And	 contrary	 to	 existing	 findings	
(Somer-Topcu	2009),	we	find	no	indication	that	this	effects	weakens	over	time.	Furthermore,	our	results	
demonstrate	that	electoral	prospects	do	not	influence	party	platform	change.	The	findings	are	thus	largely	
in	line	with	the	electoral	performance	mechanism	and	with	a	theory	of	political	parties	as	slow	responders	
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(Harmel	and	Janda	1994).	Conversely,	the	findings	contradict	mechanism	two,	the	theory	of	forward-look-
ing	parties	that	rationally	anticipate	losses.	In	line	with	our	expectations,	we	also	find	a	systematic	differ-
ence	between	parties	in	government	and	in	opposition,	with	government	parties	changing	more	on	aver-
age	(cf.	Schumacher	et	al.	2015).	
	
Do	parties	respond	to	electoral	defeat	or	rationally	anticipate	losses?	
Electoral	defeat	 is	often	 identified	as	“the	mother	of	all	change”	(Harmel	and	Janda	1994).	Parties	are	
typically	uncertain	about	the	preferences	of	the	electorate.	Still,	what	they	are	certain	of,	is	the	number	
of	seats	they	won	or	lost	in	the	last	national	election.	Electoral	defeat	signals	that	a	party	is	on	the	‘wrong	
side	 of	 public	 opinion’,	 and	 that	 it	 should	 thus	 change	 its	 platform	 (Budge	 1994;	 Budge,	 Ezrow,	 and	
McDonald	2010;	Harmel	et	al.	1995;	Harmel	and	Janda	1994;	Somer-Topcu	2009).	There	is	some	empirical	
support	for	the	notion	that	parties	change	their	platform	after	an	electoral	defeat	(see	the	citations	in	the	
previous	sentence)	and	some	evidence	against	this	finding	(Adams	et	al.	2004;	Schumacher,	de	Vries,	and	
Vis	2013).	If	parties	change	their	election	manifesto	because	of	electoral	defeat	in	the	last	national	elec-
tion,	parties	likely	already	start	changing	their	platform	over	the	course	of	the	electoral	cycle.	Hence,	we	
should	find	a	similar	effect	on	a	party’s	agenda	in-between	two	elections.	But	is	the	effect	of	past	electoral	
performance	stable	in	the	period	in-between	elections?	Explaining	changes	in	election	manifestos,	Somer-
Topcu	(2009)	shows	that	the	effect	of	past	electoral	performance	is	weaker	the	longer	since	the	last	na-
tional	election.	Consequently,	we	consider	it	plausible	that	the	pain	of	an	electoral	defeat	is	more	likely	
to	have	an	effect	 in	the	first	year	after	the	election	than	in,	say,	the	fourth	year	after	an	election.	The	
effect	of	electoral	defeat	should	be	strongest	directly	after	the	elections,	and	should	weaken	over	time.		
Electoral	performance	hypothesis	(H1):	The	negative	effect	of	past	electoral	performance	weakens	the	
longer	since	the	last	national	election.	
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According	to	the	rational	anticipation	mechanism,	conversely,	parties	rationally	anticipate	elec-
toral	losses	and	respond	accordingly	(Stimson,	Mackuen,	and	Erikson	1995).	Parties	then	base	their	deci-
sion	on	whether	to	change	their	platform	on	electoral	performance,	captured	by	their	standing	in	opinion	
polls.	Polling	agencies	report	opinion	polls	on	voter	preferences	and	thereby	provide	information	on	the	
popularity	of	the	party	itself	and	that	of	the	other	parties.	Parties,	pundits	and	the	media	use	these	polls	
as-if	they	contain	real	information	on	public	opinion	shifts	(Daschmann	2000;	Geer	1996;	van	der	Meer,	
Hakhverdian,	and	Aaldering	2016)	even	though	many	polls	are	not	based	on	representative	samples,	and	
shifts	in	seat	shares	are	considered	relevant	even	when	they	are	insignificant.	Party	leaders	of	parties	that	
do	well	 in	 the	polls	have	an	 incentive	 to	 stress	 their	party’s	 success	and	 to	emphasize	how	well	 their	
strategy	is	working.	Party	leaders	of	parties	that	are	under-performing	in	the	polls,	however,	may	consider	
this	a	motivation	to	change	because	this	signals	that	the	party’s	platform	is	out	of	sync	with	public	opinion	
(Erikson,	Mackuen,	and	Stimson	2002;	Geer	1996).	By	aligning	their	platform	more	closely	to	public	opin-
ion,	a	party	aims	to	avoid	electoral	defeat.	 In	several	theoretical	models,	unsatisfactory	polls	motivate	
parties	to	incrementally	adapt	their	platform	until	it	yields	satisfactory	results	(Bendor	et	al.	2011;	Laver	
2005;	 Laver	 and	 Sergenti	 2012).	 However,	 this	 theoretical	 prediction	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 systematically	
tested.	In	addition	to	testing	this	rational	anticipation	mechanism	empirically,	we	also	theorize	that	also	
here	 it	 is	plausible	 that	 timing	 in	 the	electoral	cycle	matters.	Polls	are	about	a	party’s	 future	electoral	
performance,	i.e.	its	electoral	prospects.	If	the	“future”	is	still	years	away,	polling	information	might	not	
be	very	influential.	If	the	“future”	is	in	say	four	weeks,	polling	information	is	more	relevant.	In	the	latter	
case,	so	we	hypothesize,	parties	are	more	likely	to	use	such	information	(H2).		
Rational	anticipation	hypothesis	(H2):	The	negative	effect	of	electoral	prospects	becomes	stronger	the	
closer	to	the	next	national	election.	
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Do	government	and	opposition	parties	react	similar	to	(prospective)	electoral	performance?	
Are	government	parties	that	lost	votes	less	motivated	to	change	their	platform	than	are	opposition	parties	
that	lost	votes?	It	is	plausible	that	they	are,	because	government	parties	have	what	they	want	(office),	
and	their	platform	makes	them	an	attractive	coalition	partner.	At	the	same	time,	this	also	means	that	
government	parties	have	more	 to	 lose	 than	do	opposition	parties.	Consequently,	Schumacher	and	co-
authors	(2015)	argued	that	government	parties	are	more	likely	to	change	their	platform	because	they	fear	
losing	political	power.	This	 is	a	 reasonable	scenario,	 since	government	parties’	electoral	prospects	are	
typically	worse:	It	is	a	pervasive	fact	that	parties	in	office	lose	between	1	and	3.15	percent	of	their	seats	
(Nannestad	and	Paldam	2002)	–	the	cost	of	governing.	Parties	in	coalition	governments	oftentimes	have	
to	deal	with	conflicting	imperatives:	voters	want	parties	to	stick	to	their	policy	pledges,	but	healthy	coali-
tion	governance	requires	compromise	–	the	so-called	coalition	dilemma	(Sagarzazu	and	Klüver	2015a).	By	
consequence,	voters	perceive	parties	in	a	coalition	government	to	be	ideologically	closer	and	as	compro-
mising	 their	position,	 for	which	voters	 typically	punish	parties	 in	 such	a	government	 (Fortunato	2017;	
Fortunato	and	Stevenson	2013)1	Therefore,	government	parties	have	good	reasons	to	clearly	distinguish	
themselves	from	their	coalition	partner(s)	(Sagarzazu	and	Klüver	2015a).	The	latter	is	especially	so	because	
government	parties	that	communicate	a	more	extreme	platform	do	better	at	the	ballot	booth	(Bawn	and	
Somer-Topcu	2012).	These	findings	imply	that	government	parties	face	an	incentive	to	change	their	plat-
form	to	try	and	escape	the	cost	of	governing.	Opposition	parties,	however,	do	not	have	the	same	incen-
tive.	 Indeed,	 Schumacher	 and	 co-authors	 (2015)	 found	 that	 government	parties	 change	 their	 election	
manifestos	more	than	opposition	parties.	Again,	we	expect	that	this	behavior	also	manifests	itself	in-be-
tween	elections	(H3).	
																																								 																				
1	In	the	robustness	section,	we	show	that	these	differences	are	robust	against	splitting	up	government	parties	in	
junior	coalition	parties	and	PM	parties	and	spitting	up	opposition	parties	 into	“mainstream”	and	“challenger”	
parties.	
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Government	participation	hypothesis	(H3):	Government	parties	are	more	likely	to	change	their	platform	
than	opposition	parties.	
	 The	discussion	above	indicates	the	interdependency	between	party	performance	in	terms	votes	
and	in	terms	of	office.	Yet,	the	literature	on	party	platform	change	typically	assumes	that	performance	in	
one	domain	(votes	or	office)	independently	influences	parties’	decision	to	change	their	platform.	How-
ever,	parties	need	votes	to	be	able	to	participate	in	a	(coalition)	government.	At	the	same	time,	governing	
influences	parties’	popularity.	This	suggest	that	there	is	some	merit	in	exploring	the	mechanisms	of	elec-
toral	performance	and	rational	anticipation	separately	for	government	and	opposition	parties	in-between	
elections.	We	do	so	by	two	three-way	interactions:	(1)	between	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	government	
party,	and	electoral	performance,	and	(2)	between	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	government	party,	and	
electoral	prospects.		
	
Data,	method	&	operationalization	
To	investigate	when	parties	change	their	platform	in-between	elections,	we	built	a	new	and	unique	da-
taset	of	press	releases	issued	by	15	Dutch	national	political	parties	that	were	in	parliament	between	Jan-
uary	1997	and	February	2014	(see	Table	1)	(van	der	Velden,	Schumacher,	and	Vis	2017).	Press	releases	
are	an	effective	way	for	parties	to	convey	their	messages	to	a	larger	audience.	They	are	relatively	short	
messages,	typically	on	one	subject.	In	Appendix	M	we	present	three	examples	of	a	press	release.	Several	
studies	on	European	countries	have	demonstrated	that	the	press	releases	parties	issue	influence	which	
issues	 are	 on	 the	 media’s	 agenda	 (Brandenburg,	 2002;	 Grimmer	 2010;	 Hänggli,	 2012;	 Hopmann,	
Elmelund-Præstekær,	Albæk,	Vliegenthart,	&	de	Vreese,	2012).	To	this	end,	parties	have	professionalized	
their	communication	strategies	and	“bombard	journalist	with	messages	on	a	daily	basis”	(Helfer	and	Van	
Aelst	2016:	p.59).	Still,	only	a	limited	amount	of	these	press	releases	actually	become	news	(Berkowitz	
and	Adams	1990;	Haselmayer	et	al	Forthcoming,	Helfer	&	Van	Aelst	2016;	Meyer	et	al.	2015).	Parties	try	
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to	influence	to	‘make	the	cut’	by	sending	press	releases	to	their	favored	media	outlets	(Pugsli	and	Snyder	
2011),	which	of	course	is	also	what	their	electorate	reads	(Haselmayer,	Wagner,	and	Meyer	2017).		
	
Table	1.	Overview	of	parties	in	our	dataset,	their	period	in	parliament,	and	–	if	applicable	–	in	office	
Party		 In	parliament	 In	government	 	
50	Plus	 2012-2014	 	 	
Christian	Democrats	(CDA)	 1997-2014	 2002-2012	 	
Christian	Union	(CU)	 2003-2014	 2006-2010	 	
Reformed	Political	League	(GPV)*		 1997-2003	 	 	
Reformatory	Political	Federation	(RPF)*	 1997-2003	 	 	
Progressive	Liberals	(D66)	 1997-2014	 1997-2002;	2003-2006	 	
Green	Left	(GL)	 1997-2014	 	 	
Liveable	Netherlands	(LN)	 2002-2003	 	 	
List	Pim	Fortuyn	(LPF)	 2002-2006	 2002-2003	 	
Social	Democrats	(PvdA)	 1997-2014	 1997-2002;	2006-2010;	2012-2014	 	
Animal	Rights	Party	(PvdD)	 2006-2014	 	 	
Freedom	Party	(PVV)	 2006-2014	 	 	
Reformed	Political	Party	(SGP)	 1997-2014	 	 	
Socialist	Party	(SP)	 1994-2014	 	 	
Conservative	Liberals	(VVD)	 1997-2014	 1997-2006;	2010-2014	 	
Note:	All	parties	that	were	not	in	office	in	1997-2014	have	never	been	in	office.		
*	as	of	2003	merged	into	the	Christian	Union	(CU).	
	
	
	
The	press	releases	were	collected	by	“Nieuwsbank”	(www.nieuwsbank.nl).	This	Dutch	press	agency	col-
lects	all	press	releases	of	organizations,	companies	and	governments	published	on	the	Internet	since	1997	
as	long	as	the	websites	are	accessible	to	their	software.	Their	collection	included	>30,000	press	releases	
issued	by	Dutch	parties	over	this	period.	We	first	cleaned	these	documents,	that	is,	for	each	text	document	
we	removed	all	punctuation,	white	space,	numbers,	stop	words,	sparse	terms	(which	are	words	that	occur	
less	 than	0.05%	of	 the	 time).	Next,	we	removed	those	press	 releases	with	no	substantive	content,	 for	
instance	those	stating	that	parliamentarian	X	attended	political	meeting	Y.	This	resulted	in	21,773	press	
releases	for	our	analysis.	
	 8	
To	have	both	a	dynamic	measure	and	sufficient	variation	in	the	press	releases	sent,	we	focus	on	
the	press	releases	a	party	sends	per	quarter.	On	average,	parties	sent	35	press	releases	per	quarter,	so	on	
average	one	press	release	in	three	days.	Figure	1	demonstrates	that	there	is	a	lot	of	variation	across	and	
within	parties	(see	Figure	A1	in	Appendix	A	for	over-time	variation	within	parties).	The	Christian	Demo-
crats	(cda)	and	the	Socialist	Party	(sp)	sent	on	average	the	most	press	releases	per	quarter	(respectively	
68.6	and	66.4);	this	approximates	issuing	three	press	releases	every	four	days	on	average.	The	GVP	–	a	
small	and	now	merged	Orthodox	Protestant	party	–	sent	on	average	the	fewest	press	releases	per	quarter	
(0.8).		
	
Figure	1.	Descriptive	information	#	press	releases	issued	by	parties	per	quarter2	
	
Note:	Dashed	line	indicates	average	#	of	press	releases.	
	
CDA	=	Christian	Democrats;	CU,	GPV	&	RPF	=	Christian	Union;	D66	=	Progressive	Liberals;	GL	=	Greens;	LPF	=	List	Pim	Fortuyn;	
PvdA	=	Social	Democrats,	PvdD	=	Animal	Rights	Party;	PVV	=	Freedom	Party;	SGP	=	Reformed	Party;	SP	=	Socialists;	VVD	=	Con-
servative	Liberals.	
	
																																								 																				
2	The	party	abbreviations	used	in	Figure	1	do	respectively	refer	to	the	following	parties:	50	Plus	Party,	Christian	
Democrats,	Christion	Union,	Progressive	Liberals,	Greens,	Reformed	Political	League,	Livable	Netherlands,	List	Pim	
Fortuyn,	Labour	Party,	Animal	Party,	Freedom	Party,	Reformed	Political	Federation,	Reformed	Political	Party,	So-
cialists,	Conservative	Liberals.		
0
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Next,	we	created	a	document	term	matrix	indicating	the	frequency	of	each	lemma	in	each	docu-
ment.3	Using	this	matrix,	we	identified	a	single	topic	for	each	press	release	using	hierarchical	topic	mod-
elling.	 This	 is	 an	 unsupervised,	 automated	 method	 to	 identify	 single	 topics	 in	 texts	 (Grimmer	 2010;	
Grimmer	and	Stewart	2013).	The	assumption	is	that	documents	with	high	similarities	in	word	frequencies	
are	 likely	to	be	about	the	same	topic.	 In	addition,	the	hierarchical	topic	model	uses	 information	about	
which	party	sent	the	press	release	to	assist	in	identifying	the	topic	structure	(for	a	technical	exposition,	
see	Grimmer	2010).	The	 researcher	determines	 the	number	of	 topics	 to	be	 identified.	We	ran	several	
models	setting	the	number	of	topics	in	a	range	from	15	to	50.	On	the	basis	of	reading	50	of	the	documents	
per	topic,	50	titles	of	the	press	releases,	and	the	20	best-word	matches	per	topic,	we	selected	the	model	
that	identified	25	topics	(Appendix	B	describes	this	process	in	more	detail).	The	25-topic	model	balances	
specificity	in	terms	of	the	issues	the	model	describes	(see	Table	B2	in	Appendix	B)	and	its	unique	topics.	
For	 instance,	 in	some	of	the	models	the	 issue	of	the	economy	was	dispersed	over	multiple	 issues	(see	
Appendix	B	for	our	approach	and	the	topics	we	identified).	The	correlation	between	the	dependent	vari-
able	based	on	models	with	a	different	number	of	topics	and	our	measure	based	on	the	25-topic	model	is	
very	high	(between	0.79	and	0.92,	see	Figure	B1	in	the	Appendix).		
The	output	of	the	hierarchical	topic	model	is	a	matrix	in	which	the	cells	indicate	the	number	of	
press	releases	about	topic	i	sent	by	a	party	in	quarter	t.	We	measured	change	in	a	party’s	platform	–	our	
dependent	variable	–	using	equation	1.	For	each	topic	i	we	take	the	difference	in	attention	between	quar-
ter	t	and	t-1.	We	weigh	this	difference	by	the	sum	of	the	attention	to	the	topic	in	quarter	t	and	t-1.	Party	
Platform	Change	is	the	sum	of	all	the	weighted	differences	in	issue	attention	(see	equation	1).	If	this	var-
iable	has	a	value	of	0,	 the	party	did	not	change	 its	platform.	The	average	of	 this	variable	 is	9.5.	 If	 this	
																																								 																				
3	We	lemmatized	each	document	using	the	software	FrogR	(van	Atteveldt	2008;	Van	Den	Bosch	et	al.	2007).	This	
algorithm	recognizes	for	instance	the	Dutch	words	“are”	(zijn)	and	“were”	(waren)	as	similar	words.	
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variable	has	a	value	14	and	higher,	the	party	changed	its	platform	substantively	(one	standard	deviation	
above	the	mean).	
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦	𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = (|345678,:;345678,:<=|)345678,:?345678,:<=6=:A 	 	(1)	
	
Figure	2.	Distribution	of	Party	Platform	Change	
	
Note:	The	X-axis	displays	the	values	of	our	measure	of	Party	Platform	Change	and	the	Y-axis	shows	the	frequency	of	any	of	the	
values	of	Party	Platform	Change.	The	dashed	line	indicates	the	mean	score	of	party	platform	change.	
	
	 Table	2	illustrates	how	we	calculate	our	dependent	variable	using	the	Christian	Democrats	(CDA)	
in	the	second	quarter	of	2010	as	an	example.	In	2010	Q1	and	2010	Q2,	the	CDA	sent	respectively	95	and	
84	press	releases.	Our	topic	model	assigned	these	press	releases	to	a	specific	topic.	For	each	topic,	we	
divided	 the	absolute	number	of	press	 releases	by	 the	 total	number	of	press	 releases.	This	percentage	
indicates	the	relative	attention	of	a	party	on	each	topic	(columns	2	and	3	in	table	2).	In	the	next	step,	we	
calculated	the	absolute	change	in	attention	per	topic	between	two	quarters	(column	4	in	Table	2).	We	
divided	 this	absolute	change	by	 the	percentage	of	attention	per	 topic	 in	Q1	 (column	5	 in	Table	2).	To	
create	an	overall	measure	of	platform	change,	we	summed	these	changes;	a	value	of	8.72	in	this	example.	
As	Table	2	demonstrates,	some	topics	are	more	important	–	i.e.	salient	–	for	the	CDA	in	Q1	than	they	were	
in	Q2	(e.g.,	European	Union),	or	vice-versa	(e.g.,	local	politics).	Our	measure	accounts	for	this	variation	in	
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salience,	because	discussing	a	new	issue	should	get	more	weight	than	changing	how	much	a	party	dis-
cusses	an	already	existing	issue.	Because	we	examine	the	sum	of	the	weighted	changes,	low	scores	hardly	
contribute	to	the	value	of	Party	Platform	Change.		
	
Table	2.	Example	of	calculation	of	Party	Platform	Change	for	CDA,	2010	Q2	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Topics	 %	Attention	2010	Q2	
%	Attention	
2010	Q1	 |change|	
|change|/	
%Q2	+	%Q1	
Public	Broadcast	 0.02	 0.00	 0.02	 1	
Education	 0.05	 0.04	 0.01	 0.11	
Employment	Policy	 0.08	 0.04	 0.04	 0.33	
Financial	Policy	 0.07	 0.07	 0.00	 0	
European	Union	 0.01	 0.06	 0.05	 0.71	
Defense	 0.04	 0.03	 0.01	 0.14	
Financial	Policy	 0.02	 0.04	 0.02	 0.33	
Multiculturalism	 0.00	 0.02	 0.02	 1	
Public	Transport	 0.01	 0.02	 0.01	 0.33	
European	Union	 0.06	 0.06	 0.00	 0	
Housing	Policy	 0.01	 0.00	 0.01	 1	
European	Union	 0.02	 0.03	 0.01	 0.20	
Economy	 0.05	 0.03	 0.02	 0.25	
Local	Politics	 0.18	 0.09	 0.09	 0.33	
Education	 0.05	 0.04	 0.01	 0.11	
International	Politics	 0.01	 0.02	 0.01	 0.33	
Environmental	Policy	 0.02	 0.02	 0.00	 0	
Agricultural	Policy	 0.00	 0.03	 0.03	 1	
Health	Care	 0.05	 0.04	 0.01	 0.11	
Economy	 0.06	 0.06	 0.00	 0	
Economy	 0.01	 0.04	 0.03	 0.60	
Youth	Policy	 0.05	 0.07	 0.02	 0.17	
Law	&	Order	 0.04	 0.03	 0.01	 0.14	
Judiciary	 0.07	 0.05	 0.02	 0.17	
Child	Care	 0.01	 0.02	 0.01	 0.33	
Party	Platform	Change	CDA	2010	Q2	 8.72	
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Appendix	C	discusses	 the	amount	of	variation	within	and	between	parties	 in	 terms	of	our	measure	of	
platform	change.	This	appendix	also	shows	more	qualitatively	what	a	party’s	platform	change	looks	like	
in	a	quarter	of	a	month	in	which	our	dependent	variable	has	a	low	or	a	high	score.	As	an	additional	vali-
dation,	we	compare	our	measure	to	the	average	attention	to	issues	in	an	electoral	term	to	the	average	
attention	to	issues	in	election	manifestos	using	the	Manifesto	Project	(Volkens	et	al.	2014).	A	problem	
with	this	latter	approach	is	that	the	topics	identified	by	our	topic	model	and	by	the	Manifesto	Project	do	
not	exactly	match.	Therefore,	we	focus	only	on	a	number	of	cases	of	clear	matches:	the	issue	of	the	econ-
omy,	the	environment,	multiculturalism	and	the	EU.	The	correlation	between	the	average	attention	for	
these	four	issues	in	our	dataset	with	the	average	attention	in	the	Manifesto	Project	is	0.76.	This	indicates	
that	what	 is	 salient	 to	parties	 in	our	data	corresponds	with	 the	 salience	of	a	 topic	 in	parties’	election	
manifestos.	For	instance,	the	correlation	between	attention	to	the	environment	in	our	data	and	in	the	
manifesto	data	for	the	Greens	is	0.67.	For	the	Freedom	Party,	the	correlation	on	multiculturalism	as	meas-
ured	in	our	data	and	by	the	Manifesto	Project	is	0.98.	This	indicates	that	our	measure	is	conform	the	main	
data	source	used	to	measure	party	platform	change	(for	overviews	of	studies	using	this	data,	see	Adams	
2012;	Fagerholm	2015).	
Our	core	independent	variables	are	Electoral	Performance	(H1),	Electoral	Prospects	(H2),	Govern-
ment	Party	 (H3),	 and	Timing	 in	 the	Electoral	Cycle	 (H1	and	H2).	We	use	 the	Parlgov	Data	 (Döring	and	
Manow	2015)	to	establish	parties’	electoral	performance	and	whether	or	not	they	are	in	government.	We	
measure	electoral	performance	as	 the	seats	a	party	gained	or	 lost	at	 the	parliamentary	elections.	We	
measure	whether	a	party	is	in	government	by	coding	the	15	parties	as	(1)	parties	in	office,	(0)	parties	in	
opposition	(also	see	table	1).	 In	the	robustness	section	below,	we	account	for	possible	differences	be-
tween	the	PM	party	and	junior	coalition	party	as	well	as	possible	differences	between	opposition	parties	
who	frequently	alter	with	being	in	government	and	opposition	parties	that	have	never	been	in	govern-
ment	(see	also	Appendices	F	and	G).	
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We	operationalize	electoral	prospects	as	the	difference	between	the	percentage	of	seats	a	party	
currently	holds	and	the	polled	seat	share	average	over	a	quarter	of	a	year.	Electoral	prospects	are	positive	
for	parties	expecting	to	win	seats	in	the	next	election	and	negative	for	parties	expecting	to	lose	seats	in	
the	next	election.	In	the	robustness	section	below	and	in	Appendix	E,	we	present	analyses	using	two	dif-
ferent	operationalizations	of	electoral	prospects.	Substantively,	the	results	based	on	these	different	op-
erationalizations	of	electoral	prospects	are	the	same.	Additionally,	since	opinion	polls	are	an	estimate	of	
the	population’s	preferences	and	thereby	introduce	uncertainty,	we	use	the	confidence	intervals	around	
of	the	point	estimate	of	the	polls	for	party	 i	 in	quarter	t	to	simulate	a	1000	possible	polling	results	for	
party	 i	 in	quarter	t.	We	average	these	1000	possible	polling	results	for	party	 i	 in	quarter	t	and	use	this	
estimate	to	re-run	our	model.	This	does	not	change	our	results	as	presented	in	Figures	3,	4,	and	5.	Appen-
dix	L	details	the	simulation	and	demonstrates	the	regression	results.	For	the	period	1997-2002,	these	data	
consist	of	weekly	opinion	polls	collected	by	TNS	NIPO	in	which	a	representative	sample	of	the	Dutch	pop-
ulation	was	asked	about	their	vote	intention	("If	elections	were	held	tomorrow,	which	party	would	you	
vote	for?").	The	aggregated	weekly	opinion	polls,	which	are	at	the	individual	level	available	through	the	
Data	Archiving	Network	Service	(DANS),	 indicate	the	polled	seat	share	per	party	over	the	period	1965-
2000.	After	2000,	the	weekly	polls	are	based	on	a	variety	of	polling	agencies,	which	were	collected	and	
presented	at	www.allepeilingen.com	(van	der	Velden	2014).	Polling	agencies	can	reliably	calculate	seat	
shares	because	the	Netherlands	has	a	proportional	electoral	system	with	only	one	district	and	virtually	no	
electoral	threshold.		
To	measure	the	timing	within	the	electoral	cycle,	we	counted	the	number	of	months	after	the	last	
national	election.	In	our	analysis,	we	also	control	for	the	state	of	the	economy,	measured	by	the	change	
in	percentage	of	GDP	and	the	change	in	percentage	of	 inflation	as	registered	by	the	Central	Bureau	of	
Statistics	(StatLine	2016).	In	Appendix	K,	we	demonstrate	that	the	results	are	robust	against	using	a	peo-
ple’s	own	subjective	evaluation	of	the	economy.	Because	parties	are	likely	to	send	less	press	releases	in	
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the	summer	recess	of	parliament,	we	control	 for	 that	 too.	Since	 this	 time-period	had	no	pre-electoral	
coalition	agreements	(Golder	2006a,	2006b),	we	do	not	need	to	control	for	those.	In	Appendix	J,	we	add	
a	dummy	for	the	2002	elections	to	control	for	the	possible	influence	of	the	assassination	of	Pim	Fortuyn	
–	a	salient,	and	highly	unusual,	event	in	Dutch	politics.	This	did	not	alter	our	main	results.	Table	3	gives	an	
overview	of	the	descriptive	information	of	the	variables	included	in	the	analyses.		
	
Table	3.	Operationalization	and	descriptive	statistics	of	dependent	and	independent	variables	
DV	 Operationalization	 Mean	(SD)	 Min	–	Max	
Party	Platform	Change	 Change	in	issue	attention		 9.49	(4.32)	 0.00	–	23.97	
Continuous	IVs	 	 	 	
Electoral	Performance	 Seats	–	Seats	t-1			 -0.13	(5.11)	 -14.70	–	12.70	
Electoral	Prospects	 Polls	t-1	–	Seats		 -0.34	(4.06)	 -15.12	–	13.83	
Timing	in	the	Electoral	Cycle	 Number	of	months	since	last	elections	 21.01	(12.40)	 1.00	–	52.00	
GDP	(%)	 Change	in	growth	of	GDP	(%)	 0.35	(0.72)	 -2.20	–	1.80	
Inflation	(%)	 Change	in	inflation	(%)	 2.11	(0.90)	 0.32	–	4.90	
Dichotomous	IVs	 	 0	 1	
Government	Party	 (0)	no;	(1)	yes	 399	(70%)	 167	(30%)	
Recess	 (0)	 active	 parliament	 (1)	 parliament	 in	
summer	recess	
430	(76%)	 136	(24%)	
Regression	formulas	 Predicted	signs	
Electoral	Performance	Model	 Pr(P)	=	𝛽1DEF7G4HIE	5FHJ4HKIL7F	+		𝛽2N4OFHLKFLG	5IHGP	+	𝛽336K6LR	+	𝛽4DEF7G4HIE	5FHJ4HKIL7F∗N4OFHLKFLG	5IHGP∗36K6LR	
+	controls	
H1:	β1<0,	increasing	over	
time	
H3:	β2>0	
Rational	Anticipation	Model	 Pr(P)	=	𝛽5DEF7G4HIE	5H4V5F7GV	+		𝛽2N4OFHLKFLG	5IHGP	+	𝛽336K6LR	𝛽4DEF7G4HIE	5H4V5F7GV∗N4OFHLFKFLG	5IHGP∗36K6LR	+	
controls	
H2:	β5<0,	decreasing	
over	time	
H3:	β2>0	
	
We	estimate	 two	models	–	 i.e.	 the	electoral	performance	model	 and	 the	 rational	 anticipation	
model	–	with	three-way	interaction	effects	(see	Table	3).	We	refrain	from	modelling	this	as	a	four-way	
interaction	effect	because	such	a	model	suffers	from	a	large	number	of	empty	cells,	which	stems	from	
combinations	of	values	of	the	interacting	variables	for	which	there	are	no	actual	observations.	This	biases	
estimation.	To	estimate	our	models,	we	need	to	deal	with	variation	between	party	observations	(15	in	
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total,	but	not	all	at	the	same	time	present	in	parliament)	as	well	as	over	time	(69	quarters	between	1997	
and	2014).	In	Appendix	N,	we	detail	the	structure	of	our	data	and	show	the	stationary	tests.	Estimating	a	
simple	regression	on	the	pooled	data	could	therefore	lead	to	erroneous	conclusions	(Beck	and	Katz	1995).	
We	have	to	account	for	heteroskedastic	error	terms,	since	it	is	very	likely	that	the	error	terms	have	differ-
ent	variances	between	panels	and	are	also	correlated	across	different	panels.	Furthermore,	it	is	likely	that	
the	observations	of	Party	Platform	Change	 (our	dependent	variable)	are	correlated	across	 time	within	
panels.	Consequently,	we	use	panel	corrected	standard	errors	(PCSE)	to	address	the	panel-specific	AR(1)	
error	structure	to	eliminate	autocorrelation.	We	do	not	use	an	AR(1)	process	with	a	lagged	dependent	
variable	because	a	lagged	dependent	variable	introduces	biases	associated	with	trending	in	the	independ-
ent	variables	and	the	error	term	and	washes	out	the	effects	of	the	main	theoretical	model	(Achen	2000;	
Plumper,	Troeger,	and	Manow	2005).	Our	model	is	robust	against	jackknifing	standard	errors	presented	
in	Appendix	I	and	alternative	model	specifications	(Error	Correction	Model)	presented	in	Appendix	H.	
	
Do	parties	live	in	the	past	or	in	the	future?	
Do	parties	that	experienced	electoral	defeat	change	more	than	parties	that	experienced	electoral	victory?	
Does	 this	effect	dissipates	over	 time?	And	are	 there	differences	between	government	and	opposition	
parties?	We	address	these	questions	with	the	electoral	performance	model,	including	a	three-way	regres-
sion	effect	between	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	government	party	and	electoral	performance	as	speci-
fied	in	Table	3.	In	line	with	the	recommendations	of	Brambor,	Clark,	and	Golder	(2006),	we	calculate	and	
visualize	(see	Figure	3)	the	marginal	effects	and	standard	errors	to	demonstrate	the	effect	electoral	per-
formance	for	all	the	levels	of	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle	(0-50)	and	for	government	and	opposition	par-
ties.	Figure	3	demonstrates	that	for	government	parties	(solid	line),	electoral	performance	does	not	have	
a	statistically	significant	effect	on	party	platform	change,	regardless	of	the	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle.	
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For	opposition	parties,	conversely,	electoral	performance	does	influence	party	platform	change	(see	dot-
ted	line	in	Figure	3).	A	year	after	the	previous	election,	poor	electoral	performance	motivates	opposition	
parties	to	change	their	platform	more.	This	effect	strengthens	the	closer	are	new	elections.	More	specifi-
cally,	fresh	after	the	elections,	a	unit	increase	in	electoral	performance	–	i.e.	gaining	one	seat	–	has	an	
average	effect	of	change	the	platform	with	0.07.	Our	measure	of	party	platform	change	is	the	sum	of	the	
relative	changes	 for	each	of	 the	25	topics.	A	value	of	25	would	mean	a	100	percent	change	on	all	 the	
topics.	The	value	of	-0.06	thus	indicate	very	little	change	immediately	after	the	elections.	This	value	in-
creases	to	-0.25	at	the	end	of	the	electoral	cycle.	This	marginal	effect	indicates	that	for	opposition	parties,	
gaining	one	seat	leads	them	to	change	on	average	one	percent	per	issue.	Because	there	is	a	lot	of	variation	
in	 the	 size	of	opposition	parties,	 some	–	 like	 the	 small	Christian	Orthodox	parties	 (CU	and	SGP)	–	are	
unlikely	to	gain	more	than	one	seats,	others	–	like	the	Progressive	Liberals	(D66)	and	the	Christian	Demo-
crats	(CDA)	–	have	known	elections	in	this	time	period	where	they	gained	or	lost	more	than	10	seats.	This	
latter	situation	would	according	to	the	model	lead	to	a	value	of	-2.5,	indicating	a	ten	percent	change	per	
topic.	Hence,	retrospective	information	is	less	important	for	government	parties	than	it	is	for	opposition	
parties.	For	reasons	of	clarity,	we	only	present	the	effects	of	electoral	defeat	over	time	for	government	
and	opposition	parties	separately.	Is	there	a	general	effect	of	electoral	defeat	over	time?	This	effect	holds	
the	middle	between	the	regression	lines	drawn	in	Figure	3	and	is	not	statistically	significant.	We	thus	reject	
H1,	the	electoral	performance	hypothesis,	which	states	the	negative	effect	of	past	electoral	performance	
weakens	the	longer	since	the	last	national	election.	Instead,	we	find	that	the	effect	of	electoral	defeat	
does	not	become	weaker	over	time,	not	in	general,	not	for	opposition	parties	and	not	for	government	
parties.	We	do	 find	a	negative	effect	of	electoral	defeat	 for	opposition	parties,	but	 this	effect	actually	
becomes	a	little	bit	stronger	over	time.		
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Figure	3.	Marginal	effect	of	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	government	party	and	electoral	performance	
	
Note:	The	straight	 lines	demonstrate	the	effect	 (thicker	 line)	and	the	95%	confidence	 intervals	 (thinner	 lines)	of	government	
parties,	the	dotted	lines	show	demonstrate	the	effect	(thinker	line)	and	the	95%	confidence	intervals	of	opposition	parties	(thin-
ner	 lines).	The	y-axis	shows	the	effect	(b-coefficient)	of	electoral	performance	on	parties’	platform	change	at	different	points	
between	elections.	Positive	values	indicate	that	parties	change	their	platform,	whereas	negative	values	indicate	the	reverse.	
	 	
Our	H2,	the	rational	anticipation	hypothesis,	predicts	that	facing	negative	prospects	close	to	new	
elections	explains	party	platform	change.	The	rational	anticipation	model	tests	the	three-way	interaction	
between	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	government	party,	and	electoral	prospects.	Figure	4	summarizes	
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the	effect	of	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle	on	party	platform	change	for	different	levels	of	electoral	pro-
spects	for	both	government	and	opposition	parties	(see	Appendix	D	for	the	full	model).	The	solid	line	in	
Figure	4	displays	the	effect	for	government	parties;	the	dotted	line	displays	the	effect	of	opposition	par-
ties.	These	findings	demonstrate	that	regardless	of	the	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	electoral	prospects	
do	not	motivate	government	parties	(solid	line)	or	opposition	parties	(dotted	line)	to	change.		
	
Figure	4.	Marginal	effect	of	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle,	government	party	and	electoral	prospects		
	
Note:	The	straight	 lines	demonstrate	the	effect	 (thicker	 line)	and	the	95%	confidence	 intervals	 (thinner	 lines)	of	government	
parties,	the	dotted	lines	show	demonstrate	the	effect	(thinker	line)	and	the	95%	confidence	intervals	of	opposition	parties	(thin-
ner	lines).	The	y-axis	denotes	the	effect	(b-coefficient)	of	electoral	prospects	on	parties’	platform	change.	Positive	values	indicate	
that	parties	extend	their	platform,	whereas	negative	values	indicate	the	reverse.	
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	 While	we	do	not	find	support	for	our	first	and	second	hypotheses	–	respectively	testing	the	effect	
of	electoral	performance	and	the	effect	of	rational	anticipation	over	the	course	of	the	electoral	cycle	–,	
Figure	3	and	4	do	indicate	that	the	patterns	for	government	parties	and	opposition	parties	are	different.	
So,	is	there	a	main	effect	of	being	a	government	party	on	party	platform	change?	According	to	H3,	the	
government	participation	hypothesis,	government	parties	change	more	than	opposition	parties	do.	We	
find	support	 for	 this	hypothesis.	First,	 looking	at	 the	effect	of	office	 in	 the	model	 testing	the	electoral	
performance	mechanism	–	see	the	upper	row	of	Figure	5	–	we	see	that	the	statistically	significant	marginal	
effect	of	the	being	a	government	party.	This	indicates	that	on	average,	government	parties	are	more	likely	
to	change	their	platform	than	opposition	parties	are.	Also	in	the	model	testing	the	rational	anticipation	
mechanism,	there	is	a	statistically	significant	marginal	effect	of	being	a	government	party.	The	lower	row	
of	 Figure	5	demonstrates	 that	 compared	 to	opposition	parties,	 government	parties	are	more	 likely	 to	
change	 their	platform.	This	 indicates	 that,	all	else	equal,	 compared	 to	opposition	parties,	government	
parties	change	their	platform	more	with	a	value	of	1.5	in	the	Electoral	Performance	Model	–	i.e.	the	model	
with	an	interaction	effect	between	electoral	performance	and	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle.	This	equals	a	
six	percent	change	for	all	the	topics	if	parties	would	change	all	the	topics	equally	from	one	quarter	to	the	
other.	For	the	Rational	Anticipation	Model	–	i.e.	the	model	with	an	interaction	effect	between	electoral	
performance	and	timing	in	the	electoral	cycle	–	government	parties	change	more	compared	to	opposition	
parties	with	a	value	of	1.25.	Again,	if	parties	would	change	all	topics	equally	from	one	quarter	to	another,	
government	parties	change	each	issue	with	five	percent	more	than	opposition	parties	do.		
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Figure	5.	The	effect	of	government	participation	on	party	platform	change	
	
Note:	The	dots	demonstrate	the	effect	of	government	parties	compared	to	opposition	parties	on	prospective	and	past	electoral	
performance.	The	lines	around	the	dots	depict	95%	confidence	intervals.	The	x-axis	shows	the	effect	(b-coefficient)	of	government	
participation	on	parties’	platform	change.	Positive	values	indicate	that	parties	change	their	platform,	whereas	negative	values	
indicate	the	reverse.	
	
In	both	our	models,	we	controlled	for	economic	performance	and	for	whether	or	not	the	parlia-
ment	is	in	summer	recess.	We	included	both	changes	in	the	percentage	of	GDP	growth	and	the	percentage	
of	inflation.	The	economic	indicators	(see	Appendix	D)	had	no	effect	on	Party	Platform	Change.	Also,	the	
activity	in	parliament	during	the	recess	did	not	significantly	influence	parties	to	change	their	platform.		
	
Robustness	checks	
The	 results	presented	could	have	depended	on	some	choices	 in	our	operationalizations.	We	have	 run	
several	robustness	analyses	and	discuss	these	briefly	here;	in	Appendices	E	through	G,	we	discuss	these	
analyses	in	more	detail.		
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	 First,	to	assess	their	electoral	prospects,	parties	could	use	different	reference	points	to	benchmark	
their	polling	results.	In	Appendix	E,	we	demonstrate	that	our	findings	continue	to	hold	when	we	take	one	
of	two	other	possible	reference	points:	(1)	the	difference	between	the	percentage	of	the	trend	in	a	party’s	
polled	seats	averaged	out	over	2	quarters	before	t	and	the	polled	seats	averaged	out	over	a	quarter	of	a	
year	relative	to	the	number	of	the	trend	in	the	polled	seats.	And	(2)	the	difference	between	the	percent-
age	of	a	party’s	polled	seats	averaged	out	over	a	quarter	before	t	and	the	polled	seats	averaged	out	over	
a	quarter	of	a	year	relative	to	the	number	of	the	trend	in	the	polled	seats.	Also	these	robustness	analyses	
fail	to	support	H2	that	electoral	performance,	or	more	specifically	the	prospects	regarding	performance,	
influences	parties’	decision	to	change	their	platform.	
	 Second,	parties	in	a	coalition	are	not	a	homogeneous	group,	since	the	incentives	junior	coalition	
party	or	parties	face	differ	from	those	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	party	due	to	an	asymmetrical	power	distri-
bution	(Strøm,	Muller,	and	Bergman	2008;	Thies	2001).	Parties	in	a	coalition	cannot	single-handedly	pro-
mote	their	own	policy	agenda	when	governing	together	with	other	partners.	To	avoid	intra-cabinet	con-
flicts	and	early	cabinet	breakdown,	parties	 thus	need	 to	coordinate	 their	activities	with	 their	partners	
(Strøm,	Muller,	and	Bergman	2008).	Given	that	governing	in	a	coalition	requires	unity	and	compromise	to	
maintain	cabinet	stability,	coalition	parties	coordinate	their	activities	and	talk	about	the	issues	that	are	
emphasized	by	their	partners.	However,	due	to	the	asymmetrical	power	distribution	between	junior	coa-
lition	partners	and	the	Prime	Minister’s	party	–	with	the	latter	having	usually	more	ministerial	portfolios	
than	the	former	–	junior	coalition	parties	are	more	likely	to	be	responsive	to	the	Prime	Minister’s	party	
than	vice-versa	(Sagarzazu	and	Klüver	2015b).	In	Appendix	F,	we	ran	an	additional	analysis	where	we	split	
up	government	status	between	(0)	Prime-Minister	party	(61	cases,	11%),	(1)	junior	coalition	party	(106	
cases,	19%),	and	(2)	opposition	parties	(399	cases,	70%).	Table	F1	demonstrates	that	we	find	differences	
in	the	probability	to	change	the	party’s	platform	between	Prime	Minister	parties	and	opposition	parties,	
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but	not	between	Prime	Minister	parties	and	junior	coalition	parties.	The	finding	that	there	are	no	signifi-
cant	changes	between	Prime	Minster	parties	and	junior	coalition	parties	corroborate	our	main	results	and	
our	conclusion	that	government	and	opposition	parties	are	incentivized	by	different	stimuli.		
	 Third,	scholars	argue	that	parties	never	in	government	(called	niche	or	challenger	parties)	behave	
differently	than	the	other	parties	(e.g.	Adams	et	al.	2006;	Meguid	2005;	De	Vries	and	Hobolt	2012;	van	de	
Wardt,	de	Vries,	and	Hobolt	2014).	To	examine	this,	we	further	split	the	opposition	in	a	group	that	fre-
quently	alters	between	opposition	and	government	and	a	group	that	has	never	been	in	office.	The	anal-
yses	in	Appendix	G	demonstrate	that,	indeed,	parties	that	have	never	been	in	office	change	their	platform	
less	frequently	than	government	parties	and	other	opposition	parties.	
	
Discussion	
Do	parties	look	forward	and	examine	their	electoral	prospects	based	on	their	standing	in	the	polls	and	
change	their	platform	accordingly,	as	the	rational	anticipation	mechanism	proposes?	Or	do	parties	look	
back	to	their	electoral	performance	in	the	last	election	and	change	their	platform	in	response	to	electoral	
losses,	as	the	electoral	performance	mechanism	proposes?	And	to	what	extent	do	parties	in	government	
and	in	opposition	react	differently	in	this	regard?	Our	analysis	of	>20,000	press	releases	from	15	Dutch	
political	parties	that	were	in	parliament	in	the	period	1997-2014	demonstrated	that	electoral	defeat	in-
deed	motivates	party	platform	change,	but	only	for	opposition	parties.	We	found	no	indication	that	this	
effects	weakens	over	time.	We	found	no	effect	of	electoral	prospects	on	party	platform	change,	indicating	
that	parties	thus	do	not	change	their	platform	in	response	to	the	polls.	These	results	are	in	line	with	a	
theory	of	political	parties	as	backward-looking	actors	(Harmel	and	Janda	1994)	and	against	a	theory	of	
forward-looking	parties	that	rationally	anticipate	losses	(Stimson,	Mackuen,	and	Erikson	1995).	We	also	
found	 a	 systematic	 difference	 between	 opposition	 and	 government	 parties,	 with	 government	 parties	
changing	more	on	average.		
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	 Our	findings	indicate	that	the	period	in-between	elections	is	an	important	period	to	study;	some-
thing	that	with	for	instance	party	manifesto	data	is	not	possible,	but	which	our	press	releases	data	are	
particularly	apt	for.	Parties	often	receive	cues	about	how	they	are	performing	over	the	course	of	the	elec-
toral	cycle.	Based	on	this	information	–	conveyed	by	polling	data	but	also,	more	and	more,	via	social	media	
(Barbera	et	al.	2014;	Barbera	and	Rivero	2013)	–	parties	can,	with	some	margin	of	certainty,	infer	whether	
they	will	face	losses	or	gains	in	the	next	elections.	With	polling	and	social	media	becoming	increasingly	
available,	one	might	expect	electoral	prospects	to	play	a	more	central	role	in	the	future	than	they	did	in	
our	findings	for	the	1997-2014	period.		
Finally,	our	results	–	and	likewise,	for	instance,	the	work	of	Sagarzazu	and	Klüver	(2015a)	–	demon-
strate	that	communication	outlets	like	press	releases	are	important	tools	to	study	party	behavior.	A	key	
reason	for	this	is	that	voters	get	(most	of)	their	information	on	political	party	platforms	via	the	media	(for	
overviews,	see	Esser	and	Strömbäck	2014;	Strömbäck	2008).	Hence,	voters	adjust	 their	perceptions	of	
parties’	platform	based	on	the	media	information	they	consume.	What	follows	from	this	 is	that	voters	
indicate	support	(or	not)	for	parties	 in	the	polls	based	on	what	parties	have	been	saying	in	the	media.	
Thereby,	polling	data	function	as	a	feedback	loop:	based	on	this	information	parties	can	adjust	their	plat-
form	and	issue	new	press	releases.	These	interactions	between	media,	parties	and	voters,	so	we	argue,	
are	important	for	understanding	party	behavior	and	can	only	picked	up	by	sources	that	are	more	dynamic	
in	nature,	like	press	releases.	Whether	parties	strategically	emphasize	specific	issues	to	jockey	voters	is	
an	interesting	avenue	for	further	research.	 	
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